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This paper discusses wine and tourism clusters and the recent
innovation of wine tourism in which businesses operate within both
industries. The concept of micro-clusters is examined in terms of
trust, networking, collaboration and other activities, all of which are
argued to depend on the concepts of game theory and sunk costs.
The study involved both interviews and a questionnaire. Conceptual
variables are created from the questionnaire responses using
factor analysis. The determinants of cluster activities are modelled
using regression analysis. The effects of industry, place and
respondents’ entrepreneurial characteristics are used as exogenous
variables. The study finds that industry does seem to be more
important than place in the determination of networking and
cooperative cluster activities, and that members of the wine tourism
industry participate more in these activities than members of the
tourism or hospitality industries. The addition of three variables that
embody the entrepreneurial characteristics of the respondents
approximately doubles the explanatory power of the original models.
There is evidence to suggest that cluster activities are idiosyncratic
for each industry–place cluster. The effects of firm size on cluster
activities are also examined. No evidence is found of cooperative
activities depending on cluster size. The main results support the
contention that sunk costs are important in the determination of
cluster activities.
Keywords: clusters; wine tourism; game theory; trust; co-opetition;
regression analysis
Clusters are co-located agglomerations of businesses, institutions and other
organizations that generate external increasing returns to scale because of their
proximity to each other and because of the resulting interactions between them.
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The standard argument is that increasing returns arise through spillovers of
knowledge and information, attraction of capital and customers, common
infrastructure and factor supply. There is increasing evidence that the growth
and performance of existing enterprises are significantly improved through
being located in a cluster and that entrepreneurship and new venture creation
are more likely to be observed in clusters (Rosenfeld, 2001; Porter, 2003).
Clusters and clustering are, according to Martin and Sunley (2003), a chaotic
concept promoted by leading thinkers in the context of an emerging knowledge
economy. In particular, they ask; ‘Why has Porter’s notion of clusters gatecrashed
economic policy when the work of economic geographers on spatial
agglomeration of economic activity and the growing salience of the region in the
global economy is being largely ignored?’ Others have concluded that there is
great similarity between Porter’s conceptualization of clusters (Porter, 1998a,b)
and Marshall’s discussion of the localization of industry into distinct districts,
not only due to natural geographical factors but also due to external economies
ranging from the evolution of local markets for labour and subsidiary trades and
from the passing on of ideas (Marshall, 1920: ch X, especially section 3). Much
of the work on clusters has emanated from the classic industrial districts of
northern Italy (Harrison, 1991). In this paper, the dimensions of clusters are
explored and their determinants analysed, not only in terms of place and
industry but also using game-theoretic approaches involving sunk costs and the
distinctive entrepreneurial traits of the participants.
Micro-clusters and networking
Recently, the concept of micro-clusters has emerged involving niche markets,
co-location and, usually, some aspect of tourism. This concept seems to originate
in a study by Michael (2002) of the co-location of antiques retailers in Australia.
Earlier studies of the same phenomenon include a study of book towns by
Seaton (1996, 1999), although in retrospect, its existence can be seen in other
studies. Michael (2003, 2006) develops the theory further, which enables the
concept of clustering itself to be examined more clearly. Michael (2006)
compares the concept of micro-clusters with the concept used by Porter and
simple co-location in two ways.
The first comparison is that there are separate direct benefits of micro-
clusters and co-location that accrue to the customers and the businesses in the
cluster. The direct benefits to the customers are not simply reduced search and
associated travel costs, but also the associated tourism experience. The direct
benefit to the business is that the development of clustering activities can
reduce business costs. It may be noted that clusters of law firms around courts,
diamond businesses in Hatton Garden, London, and many retailers and
wholesale markets are also co-located, essentially for the direct benefit of
customers. Although it is possible to see other cluster-type activities within
such localities – for example, the existence of more efficient labour markets –
such activities generally do not require the development of social capital by the
businesses themselves. These activities are spillovers and external economies of
scale.
The second comparison is that, in the case of rural clusters at least, there
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are complementary products for customers, one of which is essentially the
tourism and hospitality aspect. Complementary products for customers are
basically economies of scope in consumption, which may or may not be
delivered by a single producer. If not, then they can be achieved by a formal
alliance between producers at one extreme, or by arm’s-length competitive
market relationships. Where two products depend on each other to a high
degree, mutual interdependence has to be recognized and supported by some-
thing such as an explicit contract (formal alliance) or an implicit contract in
the form of trust. For a discussion of relationships and implicit contract, see
Kay (1993: ch 4). The supply of complementary products by different firms
is likely to be stimulated by clustering activities. However, Michael (2006: pp
73–78) shows that these developments do not always occur. Whether this is
because not all potential clusters yield net benefits or because there is a missing
precondition, such as trust, is not easy to ascertain. For a discussion of the wide
variety of cluster forms and applications, see Karlsson (2007). In micro-clusters,
networking is likely to facilitate the provision of complementary products
through the exchange of operational information, whereas in Porter-type
clusters, the argument is that networking facilitates the exchange of technical
information and ideas.
Michael (2003) explains that the typology of micro-clusters not only includes
vertical and horizontal clustering activities – that is, clustering activities
between businesses along the value chain and between businesses at a particular
stage in the value chain, respectively – but also includes diagonal clustering
activities. These are defined as clustering activities between firms in different
value chains that enable the production of complementary products or
services.
At the heart of any discussion of cluster activities is the issue of what sustains
the existence of a cluster or micro-cluster. One explanation is simply the
existence of beneficial spillover effects or externalities. However, once the
discussion of clusters includes relationships per se, this is insufficient. If firms
pursue their own self-interest without considering the effects on other firms in
the cluster, the benefits of being part of the cluster may be competed away
(Michael, 2006: p 30). The problem of the sustainability of the cluster may
be seen as a classic example of the game-theoretic case of the prisoners’ dilemma
(see Gibbons, 1992; Kay, 1993: ch 3). This problem can be overcome in several
ways, but the particular solution that would appear to be fundamental to
the sustainability of clusters is the evolution of trust. Trust is the state in
which participants expose themselves to potential risks as a result of expecting
other participants not to take advantage of them. Trust enables cooperation
and reciprocation. Trust will evolve if there is an expectation in the minds
of the participants that the game will be played repeatedly to infinity or, in
practice, to a time horizon that is distant or ill defined. Thus, the sustainability
of clustering activities depends, in essence, on repeated plays of the game
and, if the participants believe that the cluster is beneficial to them, then
they will participate in repeated plays to infinity. Lynch and Morrison
(2006: p 50) argue that the mechanism that enables trust to evolve is network-
ing.
An alternative solution to the problem of sustainability, and which, in some
circumstances, is also a precondition for the evolution of trust, is the existence
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of a cost in order to leave the game, that is, of getting out of the business.
If it is costly to leave, then the person has to stay and make the best of things,
which may be to cooperate. The essential concept here is that of sunk costs,
that is, costs that cannot be avoided or assets which cannot be recovered by
shutting down production. This is examined more fully later. The game-
theoretic implications are analogous to the idea of ‘burning one’s boats’, that
is, to construct a situation in which one has to stay and make the best of things,
in whatever way remains, whether having to fight or to cooperate.
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1997) show that if two firms produce comple-
mentary products, they should not regard each other as competitors. However,
the supplying of complementary products by two (or more) producers is, again,
essentially a prisoner’s dilemma problem. If there is cooperation between the
two suppliers, then the market for the complementary products can develop,
but if the two firms each pursue their own individual short-term self-interest,
then the market will not develop and, if in existence already, will collapse.
According to Michael (2006: p 31), these arguments provide a rationale for
cooperation in cluster behaviour: ‘In this sense, effective clustering positions the
member firms to compete more effectively, not with each other but with those
outside the cluster that deliver a similar product.’
The idea that networks can lead to the evolution of trust raises a number
of interesting issues. One relates to the idea of the necessity of a critical mass
and of network economies of scale. In essence, this can be illustrated by the
notion that there is no point in having a telephone if no one else has one; and
that having a telephone becomes progressively more attractive the greater the
number of other people who decide to have telephones. In addition, there is
a strong interdependence between ideas about cluster development and ideas
about networking. Within the literature, there are two forms of networks,
namely, interorganizational (formal) networks and personal or social (informal)
networks. Lynch and Morrison (2006) conclude that it is ‘the process of
networking that generates the desired outcome’. Tinsley and Lynch (2001) use
a case study of a tourist destination to investigate networking between small
tourism businesses, hotels, bed and breakfast providers, a gift shop, an art and
craft shop and a grocery store in order to investigate the role of cooperation
in the development of the destination.
Gibson et al (2005) add the category of semi-formal networks, which are a
mixture of social and business activities, but which have identified aims. They
discuss the Ayrshire Food Network, with its slogan of ‘thinking collaboratively’,
and which, although claiming to be an informal network, is really a formal
network of 35 members, but with sufficient informality to enable complex
interaction within the network.
The wine and tourism industries and sunk costs
The two industries are different in a number of ways that affect the potential
impact of clustering on firms and, in turn, the influence that the firms exert
on the development of the cluster in which they operate. The following
distinctions are appropriate in the Australian context:
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Wine Tourism
Homogeneous sector Heterogeneous sector
Few micro businesses Many micro businesses
Major barriers to entry Few barriers to entry
Major barriers to exit Few barriers to exit
High technical skills Varied technical skills
Can exist in isolation Needs co-location
Rapid growth/rapid change Rapid growth/slow change
Large-scale economies Limited-scale economies
Major consolidation Little consolidation
Internationally competitive Limited international competitiveness
Some of these differences may be seen largely in terms of the concept of sunk
costs.
Sunk costs, as discussed earlier, are costs that cannot be recouped when a
firm leaves an industry because a market is no longer viable. Sunk costs include
not only physical assets, such as vineyards, but also intangible assets, such as
trust and network relationships. They are generally lower in tourism and
hospitality than they are in wine production, mainly because most of the assets
used in wine production have no or few alternative uses.
Sunk costs are essentially the loss that would be incurred on any asset for
which the intended use failed, that is, its second-use value would be only a
small proportion of its intended use value, possibly zero. Examples include:
intangible assets, such as the cost of developing and maintaining a brand, for
example, Ratner’s chain of jewellery shops collapsed after its chairman derided
the quality of its jewellery; or physical assets, such as the channel tunnel
between England and France or the Millennium Dome in London. Vineyards
involve very large sunk costs, as do hotels in new and untried locations. Aircraft
and ships, although are very high-cost assets, do not involve high sunk costs
providing that they can be redeployed easily for use on other routes. Hence,
railway companies can use lease finance to purchase rolling stock, but not to
upgrade the track and infrastructure. For a fuller discussion of sunk costs, see
Kay (1993: pp 116–119).
There is a drive from both industry and the Australian government to foster
greater complementarity between the two industries by the promotion of a
‘wine tourism’ product (Dowling, 1998; Johnson, 1998; Sutton, 1998; Cambourne
and Macionis, 2000; Hall et al, 2000; Macionis and Cambourne, 2000; Mitchell
and Schreiber, 2006). This has led to diversification, primarily by wine
producers diversifying into hospitality and tourism. In the current study, all but
one of the 27 respondents who had diversified into wine tourism had done so
from a wine production base. Such diversification is likely to involve sunk costs
in the form of start-up costs at least. These costs are sunk and so, in the event
of business failure, they could not be avoided by the diversifying firm going
bankrupt in the way that a new start-up firm could. The diversifying wine
producer would have to meet the full extent of such sunk costs, unless the whole
business went bankrupt. In addition, having to face the full extent of such sunk
costs, diversifying firms are thus in a stand and fight situation and so are likely
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to take actions that enable them to survive. Participation in a network would
be one such action.
Some tourism start-ups will involve sunk costs but others will not. For
instance, a new hotel in a new location has high sunk costs, whereas bed and
breakfast accommodation and coach tour services, apart from having few sources
of competitive advantage, are easy markets to enter and exit and involve few
sunk costs. In addition, tourism has many business start-ups that are not based
on strategic assets or resources and so such start-up firms will be unlikely to
be able to gain competitive advantage.
As discussed earlier, the existence of sunk costs can mean that the prisoners’
dilemma problem does not emerge, and so it is likely that networks and
cooperation will develop between firms that have sunk costs. In turn, the
development of such intangible assets will itself involve sunk costs. Thus,
networking behaviour between wine producers is likely to be stronger and more
developed than between firms in the tourism and hospitality industries. In
addition, where a prisoner’s dilemma game is not symmetrical, such that one
player has no incentive to cheat (for example, has considerable sunk costs) but
the other does have an incentive to cheat (for example, has no or low sunk costs),
then the game may not be worth playing. In the case of complementary
products, this would be the situation where cooperation would not be
sufficiently stable for production to take place, and so production would only
be possible in-house through diversification. This provides one explanation of
why wine producers tend to diversify into tourism rather than collaborate in
some form of alliance with existing tourism firms.
The study
The economic importance of both the tourism and wine industries in Australia
varies from region to region. Clustering may well be a contributing factor. As
well as the differences discussed earlier, the industries have some similarities.
Both industries benefit from external economies, have a significant lifestyle
segment, may be co-located, have seen major growth and are
internationally traded. While these two industries provide only a limited test
of the place versus industry debate in the clustering literature, they are also
interesting because both have been a target for various initiatives designed to
improve competitiveness and regional growth in many parts of Australia.
In order to investigate the complementarities between the two industries,
in-depth interviews and a questionnaire survey were undertaken to assess whether
the respondents collaborated in production, logistics, innovation or marketing;
whether they were aware and responded to each other’s competitive moves; and
whether they benefited from being co-located with other enterprises. Three
locations were identified in Western Victoria where there was co-location of
both the wine and tourism industries. Interviews were undertaken with industry
members at each location.
The interviews indicated that tourism generally exhibited passive interaction.
That is, most tourism enterprises did not seem to engage in joint activity or
actively seek to grow their business through interaction with other related
businesses within the cluster. On the other hand, in most cases, the wine
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clusters demonstrated more active collaboration between wine producers. In
addition, it was evident that businesses in the wine clusters were more inclined
to show active complementarity with the tourism cluster, although the reverse
was not the case. These initial findings support a sunk costs interpretation. In
one of the locations, however, there appeared to be a greater level of
complementarity between the two clusters. This suggested that, in the
particular location, there were factors that led to greater clustering activity, both
within and between the different sectors. This would seem to indicate that there
might be determinants which are idiosyncratic or the result of historical
accident.
Targeted questionnaires were directed to all participants in the wine and
tourism industries who were identified through their involvement in industry
associations and through the in-depth interview process. The sample selection
process employed for this data collection was judgmental, as the participants
were identified on the basis of their involvement in the phenomenon prior to
the commencement of the survey.
Modelling the relationships
The central objective of the research was to analyse the essential determinants
of the business behaviour of members of clusters. The method of analysis
employed was to construct regression models in which measures of the
behaviour of members of the cluster were the dependent variables as a function
of independent variables that have been suggested in the literature. These were
not only place and industry, but also the entrepreneurial characteristics of the
members. However, it was also recognized that the entrepreneurial character-
istics would likely be determined, in part, by the cluster activities themselves.
This was because entrepreneurs would be attracted to set up businesses in
clusters that had the attributes from which they could most readily benefit. The
interdependence between cluster activities and entrepreneurial characteristics
meant that the variables might, to some extent, be determined as part of a
simultaneous set of equations. Hence, the potential problem of simultaneous
bias was investigated using the Hausman test, and instrumental variable methods
were used where necessary (see Gujarati, 2003). The estimation and results of
the entrepreneurial characteristics structural equations are discussed in McRae-
Williams et al (2007).
The questionnaire contained measures relating to perceptions of the
behaviour of the cluster in which respondents were located, and measures
relating to aspects of the entrepreneurial and innovative behaviour of the
respondents. From these it would be possible to derive underlying conceptual
variables by applying factor analysis to the data relating to these two different
groups of questions. Hence, several factor score measures of clustering activities
and several factor score measures of entrepreneurial behaviour could be derived.
Factor analysis determines the underlying factors, but the nature of the under-
lying constructs that the factors measure is a matter of interpretation. The factor
scores could therefore be used as measures of cluster activities and as measures
of entrepreneurial characteristics, respectively. The scores would be orthogonal
to each other, which would mean that knowledge of respondents’ scores for one
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factor would be no indication of the scores for any other factor in that deri-
vation. Orthogonality between the entrepreneurial variables would also mean
that there would be no multicollinearity between them when used as independ-
ent variables in regression analyses.
In addition to creating the two sets of factor scores, dummy variables were
also created to distinguish between places and industries in the regression
models. As there were three regions, Ballarat was used as the base and two zero–
one dummy variables were created to denote the BENDIGO and N.
GRAMPIAN regions. Industry was split into several groups: TOURISM,
HOSPITALITY and WINE+WT, with other industry being the base category.
The industry category, WINE+WT, included all wine producers, that is, not
only those that simply produced wine but also those diversified firms that
produced wine and were involved in the tourism or hospitality industry. Those
wine producers that had diversified into tourism and hospitality thus
constituted the subgroup WINETOURISM within the WINE+WT group.
Note that the total impact of wine tourism firms in a regression equation is
therefore the sum of both the WINE+WT coefficient and the WINETOURISM
coefficient.
The creation of the conceptual variables
The questionnaire, as discussed above, contained a range of questions asking
respondents to express their opinions, measured on five-point Likert scales of
agreement/disagreement, with statements designed to explore the facets of
clustering. These statements related to views regarding attitudes to working
with other similar businesses, both within the region and in other regions, and
relationships with other types of businesses and agencies. Together, these state-
ments were designed to draw out information about the attitudes and behaviour
of the respondents. There were also questions relating to the respondents’
businesses and backgrounds.
In total, there were 16 measures of clustering, competitive and collaborative
behaviour. Factor analysis revealed that four underlying factors had eigenvalues
greater than one and which accounted for 30%, 14%, 9% and 7% of the total
variation in the data. This reduction and consolidation of measures of cluster
activities thus enabled the impacts of the key explanatory factors, place and
industry, to be analysed.
The strongest factor related to the extent to which the respondent’s business
worked closely with local public sector agencies, trade associations, other
external bodies and individuals and with other local businesses. The emphasis
was on sources of skills, knowledge and information. This factor may be
seen to be indicative of network activity. This factor was thus labelled NET-
WORKING.
The second strongest factor related to the respondent’s awareness of what
other similar firms were doing, to setting higher standards than such firms and
to working closely with local suppliers. This factor indicated keeping abreast
with the competition, rather like the sort of behaviour exhibited in the copying
and adoption of successful operational and management practices (Porter,
1998a,b). This factor was labelled COMPETITIVE RESPONSIVENESS as it
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indicated responsiveness to competition. This is the spur of competitive
behaviour that is often cited as an aspect of cluster activity.
The third strongest factor was related to cooperative interdependence and
collaboration between businesses in terms of working together, sources of skills
and performance. This factor was labelled COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES.
The final factor was related to the sources of skill and knowledge from
businesses in the same industry, both locally and from outside of the region,
and to being influenced by what other businesses were doing. In addition, it
indicated that although respondents did not see similar businesses as direct
competitors, they did not work with such businesses. This factor was labelled
SPILLOVER EFFECTS as it indicated that benefits were gained from such
businesses, but without any direct contact or market relationship.
Factor analysis of the ten questions relating to different aspects of
entrepreneurial behaviour and characteristics revealed three underlying factors
which accounted for 21%, 17% and 11% of the total variation in the data. The
strongest factor was positively related to the respondent pursuing an innovation
strategy, negatively related to pursuing a growth strategy and positively related
to wanting to develop his or her own business. This seemed to indicate qualities
of being an INNOVATOR.
The second strongest factor was related to the existence of entrepreneurs,
innovators and icon personalities in the region being factors in the growth of
the respondent’s business and of the availability of skill and knowledge. These
characteristics were interpreted as those of a rational decision maker, an imitator, a
cautious risk-averse person, and so the factor was named CALCULATOR.
The third and final factor was strongly related to a question about business
opportunities being important in the decision of where to locate and whether
the respondent was an owner-manager/owner-operator. This factor was named
VENTURER, although not in any derogatory sense.
The empirical results regarding the industry versus place debate
The initial analyses involved regression models of each of the four cluster
variables against the two place dummy variables and the four industry dummy
variables. The results are presented in Table 1. The estimated equations may
be thought of as ad hoc tests, although they are almost the reduced-form
equations of a simultaneous model. They are also equivalent to two-way
analysis-of-variance without interactions. The equations are shown to have low
R2 values which, although statistically significant for models I and II, that for
model III is only significant at the 7.4% level, while that for model IV shows
virtually no fit: a 26.4% level of significance.
It must be remembered that both factor scores and dummy variables are in
essence proxy variables and, as such, intrinsically suffer from measurement error.
The statistical effect of this is not only to reduce the R2 below its ‘true’ value,
but also to flatten the estimated slope coefficients and so usually, unless
intercorrelations make it otherwise, to reduce t-ratios. Thus, rejection of null
hypotheses is generally less likely. Hence, it is often reasonable to consider
weaker levels of rejection when investigating relationships between independent
and dependent variables.
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Table 1. The determinants of cluster activities and attributes: place and industry.
Model I II III IV
Dependent variable NETWORKING COMPETITIVE COOPERATIVE SPILLOVER
RESPONSIVENESS ACTIVITIES EFFECTS
Method ols ols ols ols
Place variables
Bendigo –0.0885 0.2664 0.1335 –0.1181
(0.328) (0.003) (0.146) (0.204)
N. Grampian –0.0207 0.0286 0.0714 0.0568
(0.818) (0.746) (0.435) (0.540)
Industry variables
Tourism 0.0910 0.0979 0.0553 0.0878
(0.543) (0.506) (0.715) (0.568)
Hospitality –0.1349 0.1229 0.1021 0.0293
(0.384) (0.420) (0.516) (0.854)
Wine+WT 0.0525 –0.1411 0.3019 0.2073
(0.747) (0.377) (0.069) (0.216)
Wine tourism 0.1631 0.2901 –0.0001 –0.0460
(0.104) (0.004) (0.996) (0.654)
R2 0.0974 0.1294 0.0716 0.0482
Significance level of R2 (0.014) (0.002) (0.074) (0.264)
Number of observations 160 160 160 160
Restricted models:
R2 industry variables only 0.0912 0.0677 0.0586 0.0254
(0.005) (0.027) (0.051) (0.405)
R2 place variables only 0.0117 0.0727 0.0154 0.0269
(0.397) (0.003) (0.295) (0.117)
The saturated model:
R2 all place–industry
interactions 0.1906 0.2417 0.1538 0.1696
F-ratio 2.1014 2.7027 1.7728 2.6681
Note: The coefficient values are standardized and the figures in brackets beneath them are the
probability levels of the t-ratios. The figures in brackets beneath the R2 values are the probability levels
of their F-ratios.
The only significant variable shown to have an impact in the NETWORK-
ING equation (model I) is WINETOURISM, the additional effect of wine
producers diversifying into tourism. The impact is positive and significant at
the 10.4% level, which indicates that the diversified firms engage in a higher
level of networking. This may be due to the sunk costs that such diversification
involves, as discussed earlier. The sunk costs provide a signal and a ‘non-
returnable deposit’, which indicates that trust in the respondent is likely to be
reciprocated. The estimated coefficient of WINETOURISM is higher than that
for TOURISM, which implies that a wine producer that has diversified into
tourism engages in more networking than a firm working solely in tourism.
In the COMPETITIVE RESPONSIVENESS equation (model II),
WINETOURISM also has a positive coefficient which is very highly significant
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(0.4% level). From this it can be concluded that diversification and its
associated sunk costs lead to much higher COMPETITIVE RESPONSIVENESS
by cluster participants. Here, a sunk cost interpretation would be ‘stand and
fight after burning one’s boats’.
WINETOURISM is not significant in either model III or IV, although the
effect of WINE+WT per se in the COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES equation
(model III) is positive and significant at the 6.9% level. This would support
the argument that both the higher physical assets and sunk costs that underlie
wine production relative to tourism and hospitality, support the evolution of
cooperative behaviour. No coefficient in the SPILLOVER equation (model IV)
shows a reasonable level of statistical significance, which corresponds with the
lack of significance of the R2 value. This would indicate that spillover effects
are likely to be independent of individual places and industries.
It can be seen that the only place effect is BENDIGO in model II, significant
at the 0.3% level, but there is no obvious interpretation. A cluster inter-
pretation would need a particular place to be better or worse for both industries.
The attributes of particular clusters is discussed later.
Models I–IV were subsequently re-estimated in restricted forms in order to
see separately the overall effects of place variables and industry variables. The
R2 values of the restricted models are shown near the bottom of Table 1. For
the NETWORKING equation (model I), the R2 value falls from 0.0974 to
0.0912 when the place variables are removed, leaving only the industry
variables. However, it falls from 0.0974 to 0.0117 when all the industry
variables are removed, leaving only the place variables. An F-test could be used
to test the significance of these reductions in the R2, but the magnitudes of
the reductions show quite clearly that industry is more important than place
in the determination of NETWORKING activities in the clusters in the study.
For the COMPETITIVE RESPONSIVENESS equation, the R2 value falls
from 0.1294 to 0.0677 when the place variables are removed and to 0.0727
when the industry variables are removed. These approximately equivalent
reductions would seem to indicate that both place and industry are equally
important determinants of this attribute. As regards COOPERATIVE
ACTIVITIES, the R2 value falls from 0.0716 to 0.0586 when the place variables
are removed, but falls to 0.0154 when the industry variables are removed.
Hence, COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES are affected more by industry differences
than by locational differences. Finally, the R2 value in the SPILLOVER
EFFECTS equation (model IV) falls from 0.0482 to 0.0254 when place variables
are removed and falls to 0.0269 when industry variables are removed. This
would indicate that neither place nor industry is more important.
That industry effects dominate place effects in the NETWORKING and
COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES equations provides more support for a sunk costs
interpretation, while competitive responsiveness may differ from place to place.
In order to investigate whether each cluster had idiosyncratic characteristics
irrespective of place or industry, each model was expanded into a saturated
model with a different dummy variable for each industry–place cluster. There
were three regions and five industry groups and so there were 15 different
industry–place clusters. This is equivalent to including all the interaction effects
in a two-way analysis-of-variance. The resultant R2 values are shown as ‘all
place–industry interactions’ at the bottom of Table 1. It can be seen that the
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R2 values approximately double for models I–III and more than triple for model
IV. The F-ratios for the differences caused to the R2 values by the interactions
are shown below the R2 values. The critical values for F(8,120) are 1.72 (10%
level), 2.02 (5% level) and 2.66 (1% level). The calculated F-ratios thus provide
strong support for each of the 15 clusters having its own individual
characteristics, especially as regards COMPETITIVE RESPONSIVENESS and
SPILLOVER EFFECTS. One explanation of this could be that each cluster was
at a different stage of development, although this explanation would not explain
why the effect was stronger for models II and IV.
The additional effects of the entrepreneurial characteristics
An alternative explanation of why each of the individual cluster characteristics
was different is that each cluster would have entrepreneurs who had different
entrepreneurial characteristics. Models I–IV were thus augmented to include
the three entrepreneurial factor scores. The resultant estimated equations are
shown in Table 2 as models V–VIII. It can be seen that the addition of the
entrepreneurial characteristic variables raises the R2 values by a multiple of
between approximately two and four, relative to the Table 1 models. This would
indicate that entrepreneurial characteristics had a significant impact in addition
to industry and place. As discussed earlier, both cluster activities and
entrepreneurial characteristics might be simultaneously determined.
In model V, in which NETWORKING is the dependent variable, both the
INNOVATOR and CALCULATOR variables are highly significant. However,
INNOVATOR has a negative impact on NETWORKING, and CALCULATOR
has a positive impact. This might imply that the presence of innovators means
that NETWORKING behaviour is less likely to develop, while the presence
of calculators means that NETWORKING behaviour is more likely to develop.
Intuitive arguments can be formulated to support either a positive or a negative
sign for the INNOVATOR characteristic variable, so the negative sign would
indicate that innovators in the sample operate independently and do not
reciprocate in the way necessary to develop and sustain NETWORKING.
However, the expected sign for the CALCULATOR variable must be positive,
given the discussion in the earlier part of the paper. This result thus both
supports the theory and gives credence to the model.
Place does not seem to affect the development of NETWORKING behaviour
in model V, the strongest probability level being 0.152. Neither does industry,
the strongest probability level being 0.207 for WINETOURISM. The value of
the coefficient would again give some credence to a sunk costs interpretation,
although the 20.7% level of significance is too weak to draw a clear conclusion.
This is rather surprising as in Table 1, industry was found to have a very
significant effect on NETWORKING behaviour. However, the earlier model
only includes the place and industry variables and so it may be argued that
the results from model I may be due to excluded variable bias.
The cluster activity variable COMPETITIVE RESPONSIVENESS is the
dependent variable in model VI. All three entrepreneurial behaviour variables
have a positive, statistically significant impact on COMPETITIVE
RESPONSIVENESS. This is as expected. Place has a notable impact as the
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Table 2. The determinants of cluster activities and attributes: entrepreneurial variables,
place and industry.
Model V VI VII VIII
Dependent variable NETWORKING COMPETITIVE COOPERATIVE SPILLOVER
RESPONSIVENESS ACTIVITIES EFFECTS
Method ols ols iv ols
Entrepreneurial variables
Innovator –0.2033 0.1749 –0.0624 0.0129
(0.003) (0.023) (0.501) (0.873)
Calculator 0.4999 0.1594 0.2551 0.2111
(0.000) (0.036) (0.005) (0.009)
Venturer –0.0461 0.1862 –0.0177 –0.1958
(0.528) (0.024) (0.851) (0.024)
Place variables
Bendigo –0.1109 0.2812 0.1496 –0.0983
(0.152) (0.001) (0.153) (0.282)
N. Grampian –0.0850 0.0022 0.1029 0.0936
(0.287) (0.980) (0.318) (0.321)
Industry variables
Tourism 0.0040 0.0939 –0.0930 0.0345
(0.975) (0.509) (0.581) (0.818)
Hospitality –0.1311 0.1305 –0.0577 0.0790
(0.321) (0.377) (0.736) (0.613)
Wine+WT –0.0307 –0.0341 0.1659 0.1534
(0.827) (0.828) (0.370) (0.355)
Wine tourism 0.1081 0.2361 –0.0100 –0.0779
(0.207) (0.015) (0.930) (0.441)
R2 0.3710 0.2125 0.1358 0.1209
Number of observations 160 160 136 160
The saturated model:
R2 all place–industry
interactions 0.4670 0.3629 0.1853 0.2558
F-ratio 3.2195 4.2197 0.8545 3.2402
Note: The coefficient values are standardized and the figures in brackets are the probability levels of the
t-ratios.
BENDIGO dummy variable is highly significant, having a 0.1% probability
level. Industry is also significant, but the effects are slightly weaker than in
model II; respondents who were involved in both the wine and tourism
industries (WINETOURISM) exhibited higher levels of COMPETITIVE
RESPONSIVENESS than the rest, at about the 1.5% level of significance. This
would not only indicate that respondents who have diversified are also more
likely to respond to competitors’ innovations and competitive moves, but also
supports the view that diversified firms are likely to be more responsive because
they have incurred the sunk costs of the diversification process.
The COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES equation (model VII) was estimated
using the instrumental variable method (iv), as the test for simultaneity
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indicated that ordinary least squares regression analysis (ols) would produce
biased results. The two-stage least squares (tsls) variant had been estimated, but
the very low explanatory power of the reduced-form equation formulated
produced poor results. The equation containing the instrumental variables used
to produce the CALCULATOR variable had an R2 of 0.7652. The
CALCULATOR variable in equation VII is highly significant and has a positive
sign, as would be expected. Both place and industry variables show poor
statistical significance and so appear not to influence COOPERATIVE
ACTIVITIES in model VII directly. However, it can be argued that cooperative
activities seem to be higher in the wine industry; this is shown directly in
model III and indirectly through the CALCULATOR variable in model VII.
In the SPILLOVER EFFECTS model (VIII), both the CALCULATOR and
VENTURER entrepreneurial variables have a significant impact and have
positive and negative signs, respectively. This is as expected for
the CALCULATOR variable, although rather surprising for the VENTURER
variable. None of the place or industry dummy variables show anything
approaching statistical significance.
Finally, as was undertaken for the Table 1 models, models V–VIII were
augmented with dummy variables to test whether the individual characteristics
of each of the 15 industry–place clusters had any additional effects. The R2
values and the F-ratios are shown at the bottom of Table 2. The critical values
of the F-statistic are the same as for Table 1, reported earlier. It can be seen
that the additional effects on the R2 values are highly significant at the 1%
level for models V, VI and VIII, but are not significant for model VII. However,
the latter could be affected by the instrumental variable method. It may thus
be concluded that NETWORKING, COMPETITIVE RESPONSIVENESS and
SPILLOVER EFFECTS are idiosyncratic to individual industry–place clusters.
It may cautiously be concluded that COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES are
determined largely by industry.
The effects of firm size on cluster activities
The questionnaire contained a variable of five categories of turnover which were
used as measures of firm size. Initially, the midpoints of the categories were
used to create a single ratio variable. However, this indicated that the relation-
ships were non-linear and so four dummy variables were used to denote each
successive size threshold. Hence, the dummy variable SIZE50 was coded zero
for all firms with an annual turnover of less than AUS$50,000 and coded one
for all firms equal to or greater than AUS$50,000 per annum; the dummy
variable SIZE100 was coded zero for all firms with a turnover of less than
AUS$100,000 and coded one otherwise; and so on.
The four dependent variables were regressed against these and subsequently
other measures of size, and size was found, by itself, to have a significant
statistical impact. Models I–VIII were then re-estimated with the addition of
the four size dummy variables to investigate whether there was any incremental
effect of firm size on the Table 1 and Table 2 models. Again, the method of
restricted least squares was used to test for such incremental effects. The results
are presented in Table 3. The R2 values for the original models are in the two
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Table 3. Tests of size thresholds: significance and coefficient signs.
(a ) Models I–IV
Number I II III IV
of cases
R2nosize 0.1012 0.1363 0.0709 0.0420
R2size 0.1459 0.1974 0.1005 0.0763
F-ratio 1.9365 2.8133 1.2155 1.3744
Size < AUS$50,000 73
Size > AUS$50,000 23 +ve +ve –ve +ve
(0.041) (0.067)
Size > AUS$100,000 64 +ve +ve +ve –ve
(0.046) (0.094)
Size > AUS$500,000 18 +ve –ve +ve +ve
(0.048)
Size > AUS$1m 5 +ve –ve –ve –ve
(b) Models V–VIII
Number V VI VII VIII
of cases
R2nosize 0.3743 0.2227 0.1385 0.1125
R2size 0.4170 0.2881 0.1744 0.1632
F-ratio 2.6561 3.3292 1.3367 2.1950
Size < AUS$50,000 73
Size > AUS$50,000 23 +ve +ve –ve +ve
(0.191)
Size > AUS$100,000 64 –ve –ve +ve –ve
(0.021) (0.150) (0.010)
Size > AUS$500,000 18 +ve +ve +ve +ve
(0.033) (0.151) (0.173)
Size > AUS$1m 5 +ve –ve –ve –ve
(0.034)
Note: Only the signs of the estimated coefficients and only the more significant t-ratios are shown for
simplicity.
rows denoted ‘R2nosize’. Note that these vary slightly from the values presented
in Tables 1 and 2 because not all respondents indicate the annual turnover of
their businesses. Similarly, the figures shown for the number of cases in each
size category are for the sample as a whole, some of which would not have
answered all the questions that would have enabled them to be included in the
Table 1 and Table 2 results.
The resultant F-ratios can be compared to the tabulated critical values of the
F-statistic. For F(4,120), these are: 1.99 (10%), 2.45 (5%) and 3.48 (1%). Thus,
the addition of the size dummy variables produces significant F-ratios for
models II, V and VI at the 5% level, and model VIII at the 10% level. For
model I, the ratio is almost significant at the 10% level. Hence, it is reasonable
to conclude that size has an effect on NETWORKING activities and
COMPETITIVE RESPONSIVENESS, although the pattern of signs of the
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individual coefficients is not entirely clear. Indeed, they could indicate that
larger size reduces COMPETITIVE RESPONSIVENESS. However, there is no
evidence of an overall or systematic effect on COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES.
As might be expected, there is little evidence that SPILLOVER EFFECTS are
affected by size; although the augmentation of model VIII is significant at the
10% level, the signs and the significance of the individual dummy variables
do not indicate a clear scale effect.
Conclusions
The regression analyses of cluster activities as a function of industry and place
only showed that networking and cooperative activities were affected more by
industry than by place. The addition of entrepreneurial characteristics reduced
these effects, but the interpretation was hampered by the possibility of cluster
activities and entrepreneurial characteristics being interdependent and
simultaneously determined. The calculator entrepreneurial characteristic was
found to be highly significant in the determination of all four cluster activities
and, notably, was strongest as regards networking. All three entrepreneurial
characteristics were found to have a significant positive effect on the competitive
responsiveness cluster activity. In addition, augmentation of the regression
models provided evidence that the development of cluster activities was likely
to be cluster-specific. That is, each cluster was also determined by its own
history and chance events. There was weak evidence that larger firms were more
likely to be involved in networking, although firm size was unrelated to
participation in cooperative activities. Generally, the effect of size was mixed,
as size reflected more fundamental characteristics rather than magnitude per se.
The view that the determination of cluster activities was dependent on the
sunk costs incurred by members of the clusters was generally supported through
the interpretation of the regression results. The reason why tourism and
hospitality were generally less important determinants relative to wine
production and wine tourism may be explained in terms of the relative
importance of sunk costs, which make entry, exit and innovation easier when
sunk costs are relatively low. Thus, when sunk costs are higher, cooperative
activities are more likely to develop in clusters and the clusters are more likely
to be sustained. The efforts involved in the development of cluster activities
are themselves additional sunk costs. It is interesting to note that wine tourism
has the highest industry coefficients in the networking, competitive responsive-
ness and cooperative activities regression models, as would be expected from
having to operate in both industries. It is also interesting to note that cluster
theory suggests that integration between production activities is likely to be
through the market rather than through hierarchies. Wine tourism may be
viewed as integration through a hierarchy, although it could simply represent
the utilization of existing fixed assets more fully.
Firms entering the tourism and hospitality industries are generally smaller-
scale enterprises that have lower sunk costs than firms in the wine production
industry. As a result, the tourism industry may be seen as chaotic, with firms
entering and exiting rapidly (Russell and Faulkner, 2004). This is likely to
mean that firms and workers in the tourism industry do not invest sufficiently
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in their own business preparation and training as the expected return on such
sunk costs may not be positive (Wanhill, 2000; Beeton and Graetz, 2001;
Thomas and Long, 2001). In the same way, cluster activities in tourism may
not develop readily as they also are essentially long term and impose sunk costs
on participants. In addition, the tourism industry, by its very nature, is driven
by the external economies of place, which are the essence of tourism. These are
not clustering activities per se. Tourism may, therefore, be a case where a
difference between cluster activities and external economies can be observed and
thus enable us to distinguish between the concepts of clustering and micro-
clustering on the one hand and Marshall’s insights into the localization of
industry into distinct districts on the other.
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